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Since its origins in the 1950s, the European Union has been shadowed by the left-wing 
blueprints for continental unity which began to emerge in the nineteenth century. As far back 
as 1848, Engels spoke of how ‘the “European brotherhood of peoples” will come to pass not 
through mere phrases and pious wishes but only as a result of thorough revolutions’.1 The 
cosmopolitan ideal of pan-European revolution was advanced at the First and Second 
Internationals and later informed both Lenin’s belief that ‘socialism in a single country is […] 
impossible’ and the Comintern’s consideration of a Soviet-led ‘United States of Europe’.2 The 
ideal may have retreated under Stalin (who saw himself as ‘no European but a Russified 
Georgian-Asian’), but persisted in Trotsky’s desire for a radical federation of nations that 
would ensure political harmony, establish a single market and recognise common cultural 
traditions, with class solidarity erasing differences in ethnicity, language and tradition.3 
Although similarities exist between left-wing and liberal-democratic models of European 
unity, both are relational and exclusionary. Regarding the notions of Europeanness dominant 
in the West, Jeremy MacClancy is insistent that ‘by defining what “being European” is they 
necessarily and simultaneously create, by opposition, a definition of […] “what is not 
European”’, one of the most evident features of which is left-wingism, either in its reformist or 
revolutionary mode.4 As this essay will examine in the British context, however, the Europe 
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initiated by the Treaty of Rome (1957), which always lacked a collectivist agenda, is for many 
a less logical arrangement than the ‘socialist rationale of Europeanism’.5 
The conflict between capital and labour defined twentieth-century Europe. While the 
labour movement has its roots the early nineteenth century, it fully established itself after the 
Russian Revolution, which was followed by a rapid growth of left-wing parties in industrial 
and industrialising societies and by a wave of political unrest in Spain, Hungary and Germany. 
Although the 1917 Revolution soon betrayed its libertarian origins, the success of Soviet 
participation in World War Two vastly extended Moscow’s prestige and influence. Alongside 
its strengthening grip on Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and 
the Caucasus, the installation of Soviet-backed regimes in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, 
Romania and Bulgaria, and the partisan victories in Yugoslavia and Albania, meant that a ‘line 
dividing East from West, Left from Right, was carved deep into European cultural and political 
life’.6 Despite the strict divisions of the Cold War, the left also advanced across western 
Europe. Between 1945 and 1949, social-democratic parties became the major force in many 
governments and even communist parties gained a sizable share of the vote, particularly in 
France and Italy. Inevitably, the slavish devotion of communist parties to the USSR led to the 
loss of popular support, particularly after the Soviet crackdown in Hungary in 1956, which 
came in the same year as Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress 
and caused the so-called ‘membership haemorrhage of 1956-7’.7 Nevertheless, most western 
countries, determined to avoid social tensions, retained a mixed economy, with limited 
nationalisation, legislation for full employment and provision for health, old age and education. 
Although ground was lost to the right in the 1950s, social democracy revived in the 1960s and 
1970s, as did a reformist Marxism in the shape of the New Left in Britain and the 
Eurocommunists in Italy, France and Spain, which now sought to distance themselves from 
Moscow. Those who still believed in the historical inevitability of revolution, however, soon 
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faced the greatest setback of them all. The collapse of the communist bloc between 1989 and 
1991 encouraged a shift to the right across the continent. With its worst urges unchecked by a 
powerful left, neoliberalism entered a new, triumphalist phrase, one exemplified by François 
Furet’s claim that ‘Communism is completely contained within its past’, as though leftist 
alternatives to ‘actually existing socialism’ were neither possible nor desirable.8 As Alastair 
Bonnett remarks, ‘[i]t is a savage irony that the achievements of the democratic left in creating 
more humane and fair societies in many different countries should be overshadowed by 
totalitarian communism’.9 
The ideological conflict of the Cold War had a profound impact on modern European 
literature. The labour movement was frequently addressed both by eastern European authors, 
whether through support or dissent, and by western European authors, whose customary 
backing of containment harmonised with the cultural battle for hearts and minds waged against 
Soviet-led Zhdanovism by the US Congress of Cultural Freedom. Yet western Europe also 
produced a steady stream of left-wing fiction of an aesthetic quality and intellectual range 
largely ignored in mainstream criticism.10 If it is the case, as Dubravka Ugrešić argues, that ‘in 
the course of literary history the European East and European West have jointly authored a 
single cultural text, something like an epistolary novel’, then radicalism has been one of the 
topics of correspondence, as it has been between Europe and the rest of the world.11 The novels 
of Victor Serge, Jiří Weil, Alfred Andersch, Leslie Kaplan, Kjartan Fløgstad, Romain Rolland, 
Doris Lessing, Nanni Balestrini, Emine Sevgi Özdamar, Halldór Laxness and Maj Sjöwall 
offered some of the most incisive commentaries on post-1945 Europe, as did those of Ngũgĩ 
wa Thiong’o, Sembène Ousmane, Peter Abrahams and Alex La Guma in the (former) colonies. 
In a celebration of the left-wing contribution, Andy Croft extends the focus to cultural 
production as a whole: 
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Communism may have become a prison for some artists and a barracks for many more, 
but it was […] the distant shining city of the future for many others. Aragon, Anand, 
Becher, Bierman, Brecht, Breton, Calvino, Ehrenberg, Eisler, Eluard, Fast, Gorki, Guillen, 
Guthrie, Hughes, Hikmet, Kastner, Koestler, Leger, Lukacs, Mayakovsky, Neruda, 
Picasso, Pritchard, Reed, Rivera, Robeson, Sartre, Seghers, Shostakovitch, Sholokov, 
Silone, Tikhonov, Tzara, Wolf, Wright, Yevtushenko – despite its own instinctive 
suspicion of the world of the imagination, the international Communist movement 
enjoyed, however briefly, the energy and commitment of most major European and 
American twentieth-century writers and artists.12 
 
Adorned by caveats and questionable claims, and concluding with a needless generalisation, 
Croft’s survey still yields an important truth: that twentieth-century culture was so suffused 
with leftist sentiment that no cultural history of the century can ignore it. In Britain, the left’s 
impact on national culture extended from the Edinburgh Fringe Festival and Notting Hill 
Carnival to film, television, theatre and fiction. In the 1930s, left-wing novelists included 
Sylvia Townsend Warner, Lewis Jones, Lewis Grassic Gibbon, Robert Briffault, Graham 
Greene and such a host of others that George Orwell believed ‘the central stream of English 
literature was more or less directly under Communist control’.13 During the Cold War, left-
wing fiction continued with Jack Lindsay’s Rising Tide (1953), Margot Heinemann’s The 
Adventurers (1959), Raymond Williams’s Border Country (1960), John Berger’s G. (1972), 
William McIlvanney’s Docherty (1975) and Gillian Slovo’s Morbid Symptoms (1984). 
Admittedly, such fiction had lost the revolutionary optimism of the 1930s, a trend exacerbated 
by 1989 in leftist literature throughout Europe. The ideological despair of a character in Simone 
de Beauvoir’s Les mandarins (The Mandarins, 1954), who wonders whether ‘“socialist Europe 
[…] isn’t just a utopian dream”’, pales in comparison to that of a character in Bahaa Taher’s 
Al-Hubb fi-l-manfa (Love in Exile, 1995), who assumes ‘“that the left has died in Europe and 
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in the world”’.14 The apparent victory of global capital raised an inevitable question about the 
future course of left-wing writing. The question has been made more urgent by the outpourings 
of a literary right which, as Dubravka Juraga and Keith Booker contend, is ‘continu[ing] to 
kick the dead horse of socialism, partly on the off chance that the horse isn’t really dead and 
partly to provide a demonic alternative [to] the considerable evils of capitalism’.15 
The dilemmas of left-wing literature reflect those of the wider socialist movement, 
currently facing the so-called ‘ban on Utopia’ or ‘exhaustion of utopian energies’.16 Not only 
has the left lost its former influence in mainstream politics, but is also struggling to counter the 
continent-wide denial of left-wing history, which in its eastern European manifestation is 
deemed either a monstrosity (‘an alien imposition, an ephemeral excrescence’) or a deviation 
from the proper business of government (‘a cul-de-sac, an awful mistake’).17 In the 1990s, the 
incumbent EU states, released from Cold War fears of a resurgent left, wasted no time in 
eradicating any residual commitment to full employment and slashing expenditure on welfare, 
education and health care. At the same time, the EU rushed the former eastern bloc into the 
global market through enforced privatisation and deregulation, a form of ‘shock therapy’ that 
lost millions of east Europeans their jobs and access to welfare, as the GDP of all transition 
economies sank to below that of the late 1980s.18 Driving the EU’s eastern expansion has been 
the fear of a relapse into communism, with Brussels and Washington pumping money into non-
socialist parties in Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and the former Yugoslavia in an effort to 
‘export democracy’. As one US advisor admitted, ‘[w]e taught them what to say, how to say 
it, and even what to wear when saying it’.19 Nevertheless, the neoliberal ‘United States of 
Europe’ dreamt up by financiers and business leaders has not entirely shaken off its political 
adversary, which remains insistent that ‘[t]he failure of Soviet socialism does not reflect on the 
possibility of other kinds of socialism’.20 In eastern Europe, the transition has left many feeling 
exiled from their own life experiences and regretting the ban on further political experiment. 
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In 1989, Stefan Heym, Volker Braun and Christa Wolf were already calling for a rejuvenated 
socialism, a sort of ‘third way’ socialism or revival of Dubček’s ‘socialism with a human 
face’.21 The call was echoed by many in the West, who saw the loss of the command economies 
not as a repudiation of progressive politics, but as a chance to revive the true spirit of collective 
agency. This may entail a return to revolutionary Marxism, viewed as the libertarian heritage 
of Marx, Trotsky, Luxemburg and Gramsci rather than as the degenerate, oligarchical 
centralism of the Soviet Union. Alternatively, it may entail the social-democratic practice of 
ameliorating the worst excesses of a market economy, a practice Adam Michnik termed ‘the 
market with a human face’ and Iris Murdoch termed ‘welfare capitalism’.22 Either way, many 
would agree with Alex Callinicos’s belief ‘that the East European revolutions should be seen 
not primarily as a crisis for the left, but as an opportunity finally to free socialism from the 
incubus of Stalinism’.23 
 This essay will examine the crisis of the European left through a study of Elizabeth 
Wilson’s The Lost Time Café (1993), a British dystopian thriller set towards the millennium’s 
end. This was published in the same year as the Treaty of Maastricht which, through its 
reduction of social spending and deregulation of the labour market, announced that ‘cradle to 
grave security’ would now be less important for Europe than price stability. To question the 
assumptions of Maastricht, the novel reflects on the little known history of the Communist 
Party of Great Britain. Founded in 1920 and dissolved in 1991, the year of the Soviet collapse, 
the CPGB had marginal relevance to political life, gaining only a few parliamentary seats in 
the 1930s and 1940s, but retained a huge symbolic resonance: in the words of Beatrix 
Campbell, a former member, the Party was ‘a condensation of all the crises and collisions 
within the labour movement’.24 In examining Wilson’s treatment of the subject, the essay will 
draw on Charity’s Scribner’s Requiem for Communism (2005), one of the few critical studies 
‘directed toward the aesthetic response to the socialist crisis’.25 Scribner analyses the multiple 
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ways in which the epochal changes of 1989-91 are treated in left-wing novels, films, artworks 
and museum exhibitions of socialist material culture, finding varying degrees of disavowal, 
melancholia and mourning for an idealised past, as exemplified by German Ostalgie, or 
‘nostalgia for the East’. The response has not been solely nostalgic, however. Mirroring Walter 
Benjamin’s belief that ‘real historical memory sustains emancipatory potentials’, Scribner 
argues that left-wing cultural production also captures the vestiges of the socialist past which 
remain in the collective memory and, through them, suggests methods of future resistance: 
‘The literature and art that recalls the socialist collective’, she writes, ‘does not simply indulge 
in melancholia for an idealized communist or welfare state of the past [but] heightens the 
awareness that something is missing from the present’.26 Wilson’s The Lost Time Café, written 
during the apparent death throes of socialism, examines this sense of the ‘missing’ in order to 
counter the negative capacities of ‘left-wing melancholy’ and to insist on the enduring 
relevance of revolutionary tradition in the new integrationist Europe.27 
The novel charts the political progress of the first-person narrator, Justine Unwin, who 
is drawn back from an expatriate life in California after the death of her father, a key figure in 
the CPGB. For some years, Justine has enjoyed a hedonistic lifestyle, marrying a man she 
doesn’t love to gain US citizenship and conducting a series of lesbian affairs, a pursuit of 
private pleasure that is partly a rebellion against the austerity of her left-wing upbringing. Yet 
the Britain that she finds upon her return shatters her complacency. On the surface of things, 
the capital city has a futuristic, even space-age glamour: the corporate architecture of ‘silver 
towers’ and ‘black glass’ clusters around ‘a building like a flying saucer’, the cars resemble 
‘[t]ime capsules’ driven by ‘robotic traveller[s]’ and the streets are filled with parrots and palm 
trees, a result of global warming.28 Beneath the glittering surface, however, is evidence of what 
Paul Gilroy has called ‘turbo capitalism’s merciless destruction of Europe’s once-proud 
welfare states’.29 With unemployment aggravated by long-term recession, and publicly 
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subsidised housing long since scrapped, citizens are forced into derelict squats and multi-
occupation tenancies lacking running water or rubbish collection, competing against each other 
for survival, often through crime and prostitution (‘“You’d have thought they’d help each 
other”’, one of Justine’s friends remarks, ‘“But no”’ (50)). So atomised is the community that 
the National Coalition government, a tyrannical, right-wing administration, has scaled down 
its periodic bouts of repression, leaving it free to focus on its real interests: privatisation, 
financial speculation and real estate deals.30 For Justine, the country is clearly set on ‘a slow, 
slithery descent towards a new Dark Ages’ (15). 
Wilson’s Britain is stark portrait of the consequences of Thatcherism, which had 
decimated the country’s welfare state during the 1980s. Yet the country also functions as a 
metonym for a post-welfarist European Union, with its commitment to marketisation and 
security, its cutbacks in public spending and its culturalist plans for ensuring mass loyalty. As 
the most overt example, the capital is now called ‘Kakania’, a non-English locution that recalls 
Robert Musil’s pejorative for the disintegrating Austria-Hungary.31 At the same time, the 
currency is the ‘écu’, the main entertainment complex is ‘the European Institute’, the news is 
dominated by ‘negotiations in Europe’ and the politician tipped for future leadership is a 
‘Brussels-nurtured bon vivant’ (48, 91, 36, 257). Culturally, Kakanian society is almost entirely 
defined by generic imports from the EU. The more fortunate residents live in Spanish or 
Swedish-style housing, shop in French-sounding ‘boulevards’ and ‘plazas’ and dine out in 
‘Polish patisseries’ or ‘tapas bars’, where they consume ‘Italian cheesecake’, cappuccinos, 
croquettes and ristrettos.32 So ubiquitous are the imports that traditional Britishness seems 
reduced to residual racism (‘in Kakania hatred of Russians surpassed even hatred of blacks’) 
and restaurant adverts for ‘“roast beef and all the trimmings”’ (‘a dish no one ate any more’) 
(74, 165, 165). For some citizens, the erosion of cultural specificity is linked to a surrender of 
political sovereignty. This is the message of the Patriotic Party, a new alliance of ‘anti-Federal 
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Europeans’ which is convinced ‘that Europe was destroying democracy’ and which soon 
spawns a terrorist wing, ‘New Albion’, whose nationalist agenda of ‘“Home Rule for the 
Albion Nation”’ is advanced via a bombing campaign on the capital (76, 76, 128, 77). The 
attacks help to justify the National Coalition’s increase in policing powers, which in turn serve 
to protect its economic plans from left-wing agitation. It is within this atmosphere of violence 
and coercion, one ‘that wasn’t quite fascism but had ceased to be democracy’, that Justine is 
forced to take a political stand (78). The discovery that her father’s lodger, a student called 
Anna Musgrove, has been brutally murdered in the family home starts her on an investigation 
that leads to the dark heart of post-Maastricht Europe. 
The base that Justine chooses for her investigation is The Lost Time Café, a favourite 
haunt before her departure to the States. Situated on prime real estate near the bay, the café is 
a thriving enterprise that typifies the Europeanisation of British society. Arranged around its 
‘salons’ and ‘parterres’ is an eclectic array of Czech mirrors, Italian chairs and Victorian 
chaise-longues, where the ‘clientele’ or ‘habitués’ enjoy French breakfasts, Polish pastries and 
Italian wines, served to them by east Europeans who are ‘“work[ed] like slaves”’ (161, 10, 10, 
127, 11). While illustrating the homogenising effects of EU membership, the café also 
symbolises the historic decline of working-class politics. In the days before the waterfront 
development, when the city still had a functioning port, the café was a public house for dockers, 
then developed as a meeting place for leftist radicals seeking to associate with the proletariat, 
and later still attracted a young bohemian set, which felt the ‘hint of radicalism was giving the 
place tremendous cachet’ (12). Although some radicals still occupy a table, the owner, Adam, 
prefers to cater for wealthy ‘media types’ and ‘businessmen’, or at least for the bohemians, 
who are mostly ‘small-time entrepreneurs’ with disposable incomes (89, 10, 47). To make 
matters worse, Adam is an ex-Communist Party member now involved in shady deals with the 
government which he hopes will fund a chain of cafés from Tokyo to Manhattan. As he 
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explains himself to Justine, ‘“we were all a bit naïve, weren’t we? As if our meetings and our 
marches and our protests could ever change the world”’ (14-15). Justine’s response illustrates 
the two sides of her political nature. Shocked at her friend’s materialism, she nevertheless 
admires his success, finding in the café a sort of ‘golden glow’, a youthful energy and vision 
that ‘propelled us all forward in time’.33 
 The postmodern vacuity of the café finds its antithesis in her father’s house, where the 
investigation takes Justine on a contrary journey into the past. Professor Charles Hillyard, an 
academic and writer born into the working class, was an important figure on the intellectual 
wing of the CPGB, but became an anachronism after 1989, when ‘“the bottom […] dropped 
out of the Marxism market”’ (69). The house is evoked by Justine as a symbol of this 
irrelevance, of something ‘old-fashioned, from another era’, but also of enduring values that 
continue to haunt the present (7-8). Just as she finds the dark, dilapidated exterior ‘casting a 
shadow’ across the old university quarter, so the dusty piles of research material cramming the 
interior, the ‘out-of-date’ papers and books overflowing from files, drawers and cupboards, 
‘lived on, inert and malignant, as if my father’s ghost had returned to haunt me’ (7, 30, 61). 
Her task of sorting through this ‘dead matter’, all of which is on the CPGB and the wider left-
wing movement, sets loose an unwanted trail of memories: 
 
I wished it was as in ancient Egypt, where the most cherished belongings of the deceased 
[…] were placed in the tomb, to comfort the soul and make it feel at home in death. My 
task of clearing out would accomplish the very opposite. As I parcelled up books for the 
library and folded suits for the charity shop, as I dismantled the papers and threw them on 
the bonfire, I’d be destroying the routines of his life and all his projects. This was a non-
ritual signifying unbelief. (61) 
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Justine’s sudden protectiveness towards the belongings suggests a developing respect for her 
father and for the movement he personified. Indeed, it is with veneration that she realises the 
accumulated research embodies ‘a museum of political activism, a monument to the memory 
of Communism’, which the EU is determined to suppress (62). From this point on, Justine’s 
inquiries take two linked paths. Firstly, the discovery that the typescript of Professor Hillyard’s 
last book, an unfinished semi-autobiographical history of the CPGB, is missing from the house 
increases her sense of governmental involvement. Despite Adam’s dismissal of the idea 
(‘“people like your father – they’re not relevant any more […]. Why on earth should anyone 
want to off him?”’), Justine is intent on finding out whether her father’s death, supposedly 
caused by a heart seizure, was actually a political assassination (18). 
The second path is a more dialectical inquiry into the shape of modern Europe. Through 
studying her father’s papers, Justine learns to counter the EU’s official account of European 
history with records of the radical tradition, or what she terms ‘the unconscious of history’ (57). 
Awakened by her studies are buried memories of the anti-fascist struggle, the Greek Civil War, 
the building of the welfare state, the Hungarian Uprising, the anti-colonial struggle and the 
peace movement. There are also reminders that radicalism was a cultural, as much as political, 
formation. As ‘a Communist Party child’, one who until her teenage rebellion had ‘known that 
We Were Right’, Justine participated with the rest of the Party faithful in the meetings, peace 
marches, summer camps and ‘visits to the Moscow State Circus, the Red Army Band and 
Eisenstein films’ (62-3). The activities taught her that ‘communism’s appeal was to the 
emotions, to the longings of the hungry, the exploited, the wrecked’, but also to an entirely 
logical rejection of ‘the Ruling Class, Big Business or Capitalist Ideology’ (64). Although the 
use of capitals may seem to ironise left-wing discourse, Justine has seen enough of the new 
Kakania to know the socialists ‘were right, so utterly, and sometimes self-righteously right’, 
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and to agree with her father’s mantra: ‘“Socialism or barbarism; there’s no third way”’ (64, 
61). Again, it is her father’s jumble of books and papers that crystallises the task ahead: 
 
The labyrinth also testified to a great vision, and I knew that at the end of his life my father 
in his last work had been excavating [the Party’s] history in order to uncover the reasons 
for defeat, indeed it had been more than that, it had been intended as the rediscovery of a 
lost past, a kind of resurrection, at least a reassertion of its value. (62) 
 
With Professor Hillyard’s manuscript remaining lost, the first-person narrative is Justine’s 
attempt to complete his work, to preserve the collective struggle from forgetting. Crucially, 
there is nothing nostalgic about the endeavour. To begin with, the narrative admits the 
deficiencies of the radical movement: the factionalism, the patriarchal attitudes, the 
totalitarianism of the eastern bloc and the hypocrisy of western middle-class Marxists clinging 
to wealth (such as Justine’s own parents, whose money she inherits). Moreover, the 
preservation of the past is not the same as an avoidance of the present. When one of her father’s 
comrades describes CPGB members as ‘“displaced persons”’ (‘“So many people […] feel 
displaced. Since the Party collapsed”’), Justine is deeply affected, the remark capturing her 
own yearning for a movement that she still associates with home.34 If this could be considered 
‘nostalgia’, a term deriving from the Greek nostos (home) and algos (pain), then the sentiment 
is not the antithesis of political radicalism, as it is often understood, but rather an instance of 
Benjamin’s emancipatory historical memory, or of what Alastair Bonnett theorises as ‘radical 
nostalgia’: the notion that nostalgia, particularly in periods of rapid capitalist transformation, 
‘works within and against the present, that it reconstitutes modernity, that it is not just reactive 
but reaches out and down to shape our hopes for the past and the future’.35 Indeed, the first-
person narrative that Justine produces is a form of popular history, or ‘history from below’, a 
scholarly retrieval of the material and ideological lives of common people for the purpose of 
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accruing knowledge for future struggles.36 As Justine realises, such retrieval is essential in the 
1990s, when the willed amnesia of ‘a smug and vainglorious capitalism’, in David Marquand’s 
phrase, was ensuring that radical history ‘was being swept away even from the great collective 
memory’.37 
The renewal of Justine’s political allegiance is advanced by her investigation, which 
unearths a web of governmental corruption and violence. During the timeframe of the narrative, 
the corruption revolves around the waterfront development, where a grassroots consortium, led 
by an ex-CPGB member, is about to use a stretch of prime land to provide jobs and housing 
for the community. Just before the project starts, however, the major investor is shot and the 
National Coalition uses the resulting scandal to pass the site to Forest Brothers Investments, a 
corporation funded by the Coalition itself. The main channel for the funds is the enigmatic 
Minister of the Interior, Alex Kingdom. Described as ‘arrogant and authoritarian’, Kingdom 
seems the very image of an upper-class Englishman, although his official biography locates his 
origins in an orphanage in the Kakanian slums, suggesting a self-made man of remarkable drive 
(76). Yet the truth about Kingdom is very different, as Justine slowly discovers. During military 
service in Germany in the 1940s, her father and a CPGB comrade came across a Lithuanian, 
supposedly a communist, who claimed that his life was being threatened by fascist compatriots; 
seeing in him a future Party activist, the two men smuggled him to Britain, although here he 
evaded them, changed his name to Kingdom and started a real estate business, making his 
wealth through speculation on bombed-out residential sites.38 Furthermore, Justine learns that 
he was not a communist during the war, but a small-time blackmarketeer who collaborated 
with both the Soviets and the Nazis and who only fled to Britain because he had murdered an 
American soldier. Although Justine is wrong to assume that Kingdom killed Professor Hillyard 
(who died in a scuffle with Adam), he is likely to have killed several CPGB members who 
found out about his past, and also to have organised an attempt on Justine’s life, which occurs 
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just as she is learning about her father’s time in Germany. It also turns out that Kingdom is the 
mastermind behind the right-wing terrorist group, which he invented in order to act ‘“as saviour 
of the city”’ by opposing it, thereby advancing his bid to be the next prime minster (220). In 
short, Justine stumbles upon another suppressed or ‘unconscious’ history, that of the horrific 
course of post-war capitalism. Spanning the European continent from west to east, this is ‘“a 
byzantine underworld of intrigue and manipulation […], pulsating in the dark like some rogue 
bacterial culture in history’s boiler room”’ (123). 
Justine’s increasing insight into this ‘underworld’ presents her with a stark political 
choice. On the one hand, she can withdraw from political commitment and return to the 
decadent lifestyle she enjoyed in California. Throughout the investigation, Justine’s desires 
certainly remain those of a detached bohemian, with her narrative continually interrupted by 
shopping trips, love affairs and parties. On the other hand, she can assume a responsibility to 
the labour movement by joining one of the several leftist organisations that continue to operate 
in Britain. Most obviously, there is the grassroots consortium that fights the government’s plans 
for the waterfront, an example of the attempt by social democracy to ameliorate ‘“the savage 
exploitation that capitalism brings”’ (67). Alternatively, there is a band of Russian communists 
aiming to reinstate the Soviet Union (the way of totalitarianism that Professor Hillyard turned 
to before his death) and a radical youth underground that, with the collapse of ‘actually existing 
socialism’ and the dissolution of the CPGB, aims to rebuild revolutionary socialism from 
scratch. In this way, the novel dramatizes the options facing the left after the Cold War. The 
dilemma of 1989, Callinicos writes, is simply stated: 
 
Do we let the market rip, with all the disastrous consequences that will have for the well-
being of humankind […]? Do we seek to humanize it, as social democracy has sought 
ineffectually to do since the beginning of the [twentieth] century? Or do we struggle to 
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replace the anarchy and injustice of capitalism with a social system based on the collective 
and democratic control of the world’s resources by working people?39 
 
Although Justine gives a sizable portion of her inheritance to the revolutionary underground, 
choosing the path of collectivist democracy, it proves as undesirable as Soviet centralism, 
particularly after its bombing of Kingdom’s headquarters (the eponymous ‘flying saucer 
building’) looks set to bring the Minister even more popular support (120, 195). It is partly the 
failure of the contemporary left, and partly her acculturation in a capitalist society, that leads 
Justine back to the bourgeois individualism represented by The Lost Time Café. After Adam 
is killed in the attack on Kingdom’s building, she inherits the café and takes to the work like a 
true entrepreneur, giving no further thought to collectivist action or the city’s dispossessed. 
After the truth about Kingdom emerges, and the government can no longer hold onto the 
waterfront project, the café even looks set to benefit financially from the social housing that 
the consortium will bring to the district, a reminder that in a system of ‘welfare capitalism’ it 
is always capitalism that dominates. Despite her temporary drift to the left, Justine’s ambitions 
lie elsewhere: ‘I’m really a loner’, she admits: ‘I like the spectacle, the flirting, the dance on 
the surface’ (259). The closing scene, in which she arranges ‘a proper Party funeral’ for her 
father, is less a celebration of the Professor than a final rejection, a laying to rest of the ghost 
summoned up by his research (71). The sense that the ending is ultimately pessimistic about 
political reform is heightened by the fact that it is the ‘Brussels-nurtured bon vivant’ who takes 
over as Prime Minster and that the EU continues its post-Cold War expansion, descending on 
the former eastern bloc ‘“like vultures on the corpse”’ (68). 
The message of the novel, however, does not lie in the ideological vagaries of its 
narrator. Despite her turn to business, Justine’s completion of the left-wing history that her 
father began offers a clear ‘reassertion of its value’, insisting that the history of socialism is 
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necessary for understanding and solving the crisis of late twentieth-century Europe. In this way, 
Wilson departs from the major strand of British speculative writing on the EU. The dystopian 
novels of such ‘reluctant Europeans’ as Andrew Roberts, Brian Aldiss and Rob Grant have 
challenged Europeanist fervour with right-wing calls for a return to isolationism.40 For Wilson, 
herself a former member of the CPGB, it was not isolationism that was needed, nor a further 
swing to the right, but a socialist basis for continental unity, however unlikely this may have 
appeared. In this sense, The Lost Time Café is aligned to a number of post-1989 realist novels 
– Jeff Torrington’s Swing Hammer Swing! (1992), James Kelman’s How Late It Was, How 
Late (1994), Livi Michael’s All the Dark Air (1997) – which retain socialist values in a decade 
when ‘there was not even a language in which to talk about socialism, much less something as 
insane as revolution’.41 Indeed, the on-going ills of capitalism, which according to one estimate 
have caused 100 million deaths from war, genocide and imperial exploitation over the 
centuries, only serve to emphasise that socialism’s ‘underlying value, the wish to create a 
system of social justice, […] should be retained’.42 In the mid-1990s, as neoliberalism gathered 
pace, there was both a rise of progressive politics in western Europe and a return to power of 
former communist parties in most eastern European countries, even if these were still obliged 
by the EU to stick to the path of liberalisation. The movement for political and economic reform 
needs more authors who are prepared to say to the EU, in Albert Camus’s famous phrase, 
‘[y]our Europe is not ours’.43 
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